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a  b  s  t  r a  c t
Operations Management  and  Supply  Chain  Management (OM/SCM),  as a discipline, can  benefit  from
proper  theorizing to address  persistent  urgings  for  better  and  new theories.  This  paper hopes  to inspire
more  theorizing  engagements through  the  formal  process of  metaphorical  transfer.  Metaphorical  trans-
fer transforms  casually-invoked  metaphors  in everyday  language  into  theory-constitutive  metaphors.
This  transformation  process  first  mandates  theorizing  to ensure  equivalence  between  the domain  of the
metaphor  and that  of a target  phenomenon  or  research  problem of interest. Second,  theorizing  during
metaphorical transfer  occurs  when  abstracted  insights  intended  to  govern  both the  metaphor  and  target
phenomenon  materialize.  Finally, metaphorical  transfer  supports borrowing of theories  from outside  of
OM/SCM  for  testing within  OM/SCM  by  safeguarding  against  common mistakes.  This  paper demonstrates
metaphorical transfer  via  the example  of divorce  and strategic  buyer–supplier  relationship  dissolution
and  concludes  by  highlighting other  metaphors  that may  be  invoked  for  a number  of exemplary  supply
chain  relationship  phenomena.
Published by  Elsevier  B.V.
1. Introduction
Operations Management and Supply Chain Management
(OM/SCM), as a discipline, has often been chided for being athe-
oretical and for its neglect and inadequate attention to building
theories (Flynn et al., 1990; Schmenner and Swink, 1998).4 On
the one hand, OM/SCM researchers have responded to  this criti-
cism by borrowing theories from other disciplines to  build and/or
test propositions about OM/SCM phenomena (Amundson, 1998;
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E-mail addresses: yisuchen@umich.edu (Y.-S. Chen),
rungtusanatham 1@fisher.osu.edu (M.J. Rungtusanatham), meyer033@umn.edu
(S.M. Goldstein), koern011@umn.edu (A.F. Koerner).
1 Tel.: +1 614 292 0680; fax: +1 614 292 1272.
2 Tel.: +1 612 626 0271; fax: +1 612 624 8804.
3 Tel.: +1 612 624 4030; fax: +1 612 624 6544.
4 While we  refer to OM/SCM as a single discipline, we  recognize that there are
divergent opinions as to whether OM and SCM represent the same discipline or
whether  OM subsumes SCM or vice versa.
Carter, 2011; Rungtusanatham and Anderson, 1996). Special issues
of disciplinary journals have been dedicated to  encouraging greater
incorporation of theories from other disciplines (e.g., Ketchen and
Hult, 2007). Articles have similarly been published to  draw atten-
tion to  specific theories and their utility for OM/SCM research (e.g.,
Amundson, 1998; Grover and Malhotra, 2003).
On  the other hand, the OM/SCM discipline has responded to this
criticism by calling for more theorizing efforts aimed at producing
better and new theories (Carter, 2011; Flynn et al., 1990; Melnyk
and Handfield, 1998; Schmenner and Swink, 1998; Schroeder,
2008). Theorizing is a  conscious thought process that attempts to
explain observations, an “ideational trial and error” process to make
sense of a  phenomenon of interest (Weick, 1989: 518). The intent
of theorizing is  to produce full-blown theories through “activities
like abstracting, generalizing, relating, selecting, explaining, syn-
thesizing, and idealizing” (Weick, 1995: 389). These activities can
be informed by simulation methods to  make emergent theories
more logically precise and comprehensive (Davis et al., 2007); by
paradox resolution methods that spatially or temporally separate
opposing explanations about a  phenomenon or  that introduce new
0272-6963/$ – see front matter. Published by  Elsevier B.V.
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concepts to synthesize and resolve explanatory tensions about a
phenomenon (Poole and Van de Ven, 1989);  and by  metaphori-
cal  thinking to frame and understand a  phenomenon of interest
(Morgan, 1980, 2006; Weick, 1989).
Our paper introduces metaphorical transfer, a structured mech-
anism for theorizing, in the OMS/SCM discipline. Divorce as a
metaphor for strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution
serves as an example to facilitate this introduction because divorce
is  often invoked in referring to  the termination of strategic
buyer–supplier relationships (e.g., Levitt, 1983). Our intent is to
inspire more theorizing of OMS/SCM phenomena through the invo-
cation of theory-constitutive metaphors and to ensure the proper
borrowing and testing of theories from outside OM/SCM. Sec-
tion 2 provides a brief discussion of what metaphorical transfer
entails and how it aids theorizing. Section 3 illustrates the steps of
metaphorical transfer as applied to the divorce metaphor for strate-
gic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution. We  chose this example
because divorce is  often casually invoked when referring to  the
termination of strategic buyer–supplier relationships (e.g., Levitt,
1983). Section 4 concludes by  highlighting other metaphors that
may be invoked to promote theorizing of other exemplary supply
chain relationship phenomena.
2. Metaphorical transfer as a  theorizing mechanism
“Relationship management between buyers and sellers is much
like that between husbands and wives.  . .[The] sale merely con-
summates the courtship, at which point the marriage begins.
The quality of the marriage determines whether there will be
continued or expanded business, or troubles and divorce.”
(Levitt, 1983: 111)
A metaphor is “a linguistic utterance in  which the combina-
tion of words is literally deviant in the sense that terms that
have originally or  conventionally been employed in  relation to  a
different concept or domain are applied and connected to  a  tar-
get  term or concept” (Cornelissen et al., 2005: 1549). Labeling
two business partners in a  strategic buyer–supplier relationship
as  spouses in a marriage and relationship termination as divorce
(Levitt, 1983) is an example of the casual use of metaphors.
However, casually-invoked metaphors only assume a literary
role whose utterance is rarely intended to  facilitate theorizing.
Casually-invoked metaphors familiarize the uninformed about a
phenomenon of interest that is  less known (e.g., the dissolution of
a strategic buyer–supplier relationship) in terms of a  source phe-
nomenon that is more familiar (i.e.,  a  divorce) (Morgan, 2006).
2.1. From literary to theory-constitutive metaphors
For casually-invoked metaphors to support theorizing in scien-
tific endeavors, they have to become theory-constitutive (Boyd,
1993). A theory-constitutive metaphor “serves to  generate an
image for studying a  [phenomenon]. . .[that] can provide the basis
for detailed scientific research based upon attempts to discover the
extent to  which features of the metaphor are found in  the subject
of inquiry” (Morgan, 1980: 611). To transform a literary metaphor
into one that is theory-constitutive, a  formal process of metaphor-
ical transfer (Hunt and Menon, 1995) or metaphorical reasoning
(Van den Bulte, 1994)  must be undertaken. Metaphorical transfer
is deliberate in transferring and translating information between
the domain of the source phenomenon (i.e., the metaphor) and
the domain of the phenomenon of interest (i.e., target) at various
levels of abstractions. This deliberate effort strives “to reduce [cog-
nitive and emotive] tensions [from asserting that two phenomena
are existentially identical] through seeking similarities between the
two domains” (Hunt and Menon, 1995: 83).
Fig.  1 shows that a  metaphorical transfer formally demonstrates
conceptual similarity or equivalence between the metaphor and
target at three hierarchical levels: ontology, analogy, and identity
(Tsoukas, 1991; Garud and Kotha, 1994). The lowest level, ontol-
ogy, demonstrates logical correspondence between the constituent
elements of the metaphor and target. The constituent elements of a
phenomenon connote the “whats” in a theory of the phenomenon
(Whetten, 1989). The middle level of analogy demonstrates corre-
spondence between relationships among constituent elements of
the metaphor and relationships among constituent elements of  the
target. At the level of analogy, the “hows” and “whys” of the inter-
relationships among the “whats” (elements) of the metaphor are
verified as being equivalent to those of the target. Demonstrating
equivalences at the ontological and analogical levels ensures that
the goal of accuracy for building theory (cf., Ketchen and Hult, 2011)
is achievable within the respective phenomenon and between
B
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Fig. 1. Metaphorical transfer: equivalence at  the levels of ontology, analogy, and identity.
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the metaphor and target. Ontological and analogical equivalences
then motivate the emergence of more general principles that aptly
explain aspects of both the metaphor and the target at the highest
and most challenging level of identity. The identity-level principles
are generalizable insights (cf., Ketchen and Hult, 2011) that provide
the theoretical rationale for what, how, and why the metaphor and
the  target are identical (Garud and Kotha, 1994).
Two important points about metaphorical transfer deserve
clarification. First, metaphorical transfer does not have to be
a strictly hierarchical movement up the ladder of abstraction
from ontology to analogy to  identity (Tsoukas, 1991). Garud
and Kotha (1994), for example, invoked the human brain as a
metaphor for flexible production systems and demonstrated equiv-
alence at the level of ontology, and then the level of identity,
before proceeding to establish equivalence at the level of anal-
ogy. Second, metaphorical transfer is not  intended to  demonstrate
exhaustiveness at any level. Instead, at each level of theoretical
juxtaposition, “the  initial metaphorical insight [at a  lower level of
abstraction] is  progressively refined through a set of homomor-
phic transformations. . .many-to-one transformations that  retain
only key facets that link the source and target, while discarding
irrelevant facets” (Garud and Kotha, 1994: 674). As such, the aspi-
ration at the ontological level is not  to identify all constituent
elements that are equivalent between the metaphor and the tar-
get, but rather only those deemed to be key facets. Similarly, the
aspiration at the analogical level is  to map  relationships among con-
stituent elements of the metaphor to those of the target, as opposed
to all possible relationships. Finally, the aspiration at the identity
level is to generate principles that subsume equivalences at the
levels of analogy and ontology, as opposed to  all possible principles.
2.2. The theorizing roles of metaphorical transfer
Metaphorical transfer engages directly in  theorizing when
transforming a  casual metaphor for a  target into a metaphor that
is theory-constitutive. The very act of establishing ontological and
analogical equivalences between the metaphor and target performs
the activities that Weick (1995) identifies as theorizing in order to
frame explanations about the target in  the scientific knowledge
(i.e., lexicon, concepts, and theories) of the metaphor (Morgan,
1980; Van den Bulte, 1994). Theorizing is  also needed to  draw out
abstracted insights applicable to  both the metaphor and target to
establish equivalence at the level of identity (Morgan, 1980; Van
den Bulte, 1994).
Once completed, metaphorical transfer supports theorizing by
facilitating the proper borrowing of theories about the metaphor
for testing in  the context of the target. Efforts to  theorize about
OM/SCM phenomena via  the lens of theories from other disciplines
are already common (Amundson, 1998; Carter, 2011) but, these
efforts have not  always been problem-free (cf., Rungtusanatham
and Anderson, 1996). Metaphorical transfer minimizes problems
with such efforts and safeguards against two common mistakes.
One mistake is ignoring differences in levels of analysis across
phenomena (Whetten et al., 2009). A  second mistake is  under-
exploring contextual differences across phenomena (Whetten et al.,
2009). Metaphorical transfer ensures proper importation of the-
ories from one discipline to aid theorizing of a phenomenon in
another discipline.
3. Divorce as a metaphor for strategic buyer–supplier
relationship dissolution
The dissolution of a  strategic buyer–supplier relationship is
often casually equated to divorce between marital partners (Guillet
de Monthoux, 1975; Perrien et al., 1995; Vaaland, 2004; Vaaland
and Purchase, 2005). This casual utterance intuitively makes sense
but, at the same time, has been criticized for ignoring the obvi-
ous, namely that the two phenomena actually exist at different
levels of analysis (O’Malley et al., 2008). The remedy is  to use the
formal process of metaphorical transfer to transform divorce into
a  theory-constitutive metaphor for strategic buyer–supplier rela-
tionship dissolution.
3.1. Equating divorce to strategic buyer–supplier relationship
dissolution
3.1.1. Equivalence at the level of ontology
Fig. 2 summarizes the ontological elements of divorce, those of
strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution, and the one-to-
one mapping between the two sets.
Divorce. This legal and emotional act of dissolving a  marital
relationship contract releases marital partners from their commit-
ment to each other and alters their legal obligations and privileges
(Bernard, 1970). Divorce mandates division and reallocation of
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Fig. 2. Equivalence at  the level of ontology: divorce and strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution.
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jointly-owned property accumulated during the marriage, as well
as household income in  the form of alimony. With children, divorce
necessitates agreement as to their legal custody and to  the fre-
quency and monetary amount of child support (Morgan, 1996 and
Supplement 2001).
Divorce often requires a  repositioning of one or both marital
partners within the previously-shared social network that then
ends in a “community divorce” (Sprecher et al., 2006). One party
in the divorce may  deliberately distance himself or  herself from
individuals who, prior to the marriage, had a  friendship with the
other in the divorce (Sprecher et al., 2006). Similarly, other individ-
uals in the previously-shared network may  deliberately distance
themselves from one of the divorcees (Bernard, 1970).
Strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution.  The dissolution
of a strategic buyer–supplier relationship, likewise, terminates a
previously-established, long-term legal relationship between two
business entities (Stoltman and Morgan, 2002; Mayer and Teece,
2008). This termination releases the buyer and supplier from their
legal commitments once current obligations are fulfilled (Macneil,
1978), and is often complex and stressful (Giller and Matear, 2001;
Stoltman and Morgan, 2002). In terminating the strategic relation-
ship, the buyer and supplier agree to the “division or custody of
relationship-specific assets” from joint investments (Stoltman and
Morgan, 2002: 67). When the dissolution arises from one entity
breaching contract terms, the injured entity may  also ask for com-
pensation to recoup its investments in  relationship-specific assets
(Marsh, 2001). Following disposition, the supplier must honor obli-
gations to fulfill existing work orders and to maintain availability
of spare units as  contracted; the buyer, in return, has to continue
to make payments for work performed or items received. Failure
to uphold these obligations can lead to financial penalties (Mayer
and Teece, 2008).
The dissolution of a strategic buyer–supplier relationship
restructures the supply network; the supplier has to find a  replace-
ment buyer and vice versa (Harrison, 2004; Pressey and Qiu, 2007).
Sometimes the supply network is altered before existing obliga-
tions expire because other entities in the network may  intentionally
distance themselves from either the supplier or buyer. Consider, for
example, a strategic buyer–supplier relationship being dissolved
due to product failure and the associated liability. Other entities
in the supply network may  alter their relationships with the buyer
and/or the supplier out of fear that they may  receive defective items
(Eisenberg, 2000) or that their reputation may  be tarnished by asso-
ciation (Wilson, 2001). When one party is  terminated by  another,
other entities in the supply network may  distance themselves from
the terminated party out of the fear that they may  be similarly ter-
minated in the near future (Tähtinen and Vaaland, 2006; Vaaland
et al., 2004).
3.1.2. Equivalence at the level of analogy
The relevant relationships among the ontological elements of
divorce total 247; those of strategic buyer–supplier relationship
dissolution similarly number 247.5 To establish equivalence at the
level of analogy between the 247 relationships of divorce and those
of strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution is impractical.
Importantly, as argued by Garud and Kotha (1994), lower-level
relationships among ontological elements can be subsumed by
5 Given a set of E distinct elements, a subset of r elements can be selected, with
r  ≤ E and with each selected subset being a  combination. Suppose E = 3 elements of A,
B,  and C and r = 2, then there are  three possible combinations that can  be selected –
i.e.,  AB, AC, and BC. Given a set of E elements, the number of r-combinations that can
be  formed without repetition, or CEr ,  is  given by
E!
r!(E−r)!
. Hence, C8
2
= 28 combinations
of  two elements, C8
3
=  56, C8
4
= 70, C8
5
= 56, C8
6
=  28, C8
7
= 8,  and C8
8
= 1. The total
sums to 247 relationships among two elements, three elements, four elements, five
elements, six elements, seven elements, and eight elements.
carefully-chosen higher-level categorizations. For our  purpose,
material, psyche, and social network are appropriate higher-level
categorizations that represent contributions to current under-
standing about divorce from economics (e.g., Becker, 1973; Becker
et al., 1977), psychology (e.g., Amato and Keith, 1991), and sociol-
ogy (e.g., Furstenberg, 1990),  respectively. Analogical equivalence
between divorce and strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolu-
tion is  established by demonstrating correspondences with respect
to  these three aspects.
The material aspect.  The material aspect subsumes ontological
elements and their inter-relationships that relate to financial and
nonfinancial assets. Divorce results in a loss of existing economic
resources because properties and household income, as part of
relationship termination, are now divided. For individuals, post-
divorce, to  maintain the same standard of living as when married,
they have to  earn an average of 31% more (Sorensen, 1992). Divorce
discontinues future gains associated with the efficient division of
labor in  marriage (Sayer, 2006). Divorce also necessitates a material
provision to children for an extended period of time.
Strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution, likewise,
imposes negative material consequences for both the buyer
and supplier. Terminating a  strategic buyer–supplier relationship
reallocates jointly-owned assets and mandates appropriate com-
pensation for the loss associated with such division (Marsh, 2001).
Once dissolved, neither entity has access to  financial benefits
previously generated from being in  a  strategic relationship with
each other. Both the buyer and supplier, post-dissolution, are also
deprived of opportunities to participate in each other’s business
activities for economic gains. For example, the buyer stops partak-
ing in the development of the supplier’s proprietary technologies,
and the supplier loses access to training and other types of financial
and non-financial aid from the buyer.
The psyche aspect.  The psyche aspect subsumes relationships
among ontological elements that represent emotional and psycho-
logical effects. Stressful events can cause spouses to  experience
sadness, frustration, and loss of trust, and to contemplate divorce.
Infidelity is  an example of a  stressful event, and is  a  leading cause
of divorce (Previti and Amato, 2004). Increased levels of  stress also
results from the very act of divorcing as spouses deal with other
aspects (economic and social network) of separation (Tashiro et al.,
2006).
In  a strategic buyer–supplier relationship, poor management
of interactions between the entities often results in stress. Stress,
in turn, introduces instability into the relationship and may  trig-
ger its eventual dissolution (Holmlund-Rytkonen and Strandvik,
2005; Vaaland, 2004). For example, unsatisfactory performance by
an incumbent strategic supplier creates stress for the buyer and
prompts the buyer to consider alternative supply sources (Farrell
and Gallini, 1988). When the buyer acts to  add a  competing sup-
ply source, this elevates stress for the incumbent strategic supplier,
destabilizing and pushing the strategic relationship toward termi-
nation (Gadde and Mattsson, 1987).
The social network aspect.  The social network aspect sub-
sumes relationships among ontological elements that represent
dissolution-associated changes to social networks. A social network
may prompt individuals to marry because of support and encour-
agement from close friends and family. Once married, marital
partners initially navigate between their separate social networks
but eventually fuse them into a new, single network (Sprecher
et al., 2006). This fusion of social networks provides marital part-
ners with social resources to  which they otherwise have limited
access. A marriage may  also dissolve, with the breakup encouraged
by friends and family or as opportunities to form new relationships
with alternatives in the combined social network are identified.
Following divorce, the fused social network becomes disjointed as
the terminating parties distance themselves from other individuals
Y.-S.  Chen et al. /  Journal of Operations Management 31 (2013) 579–586 583
in the previously-fused social network or  vice versa (Sprecher et al.,
2006).
Similarly, in  a  strategic buyer–supplier relationship, access
to  the supply (i.e., social) network of the other entity may  be
an incentive for entering the relationship. For example, when a
keiretsu supplier establishes a strategic relationship with Toyota,
it can exchange knowledge with other Toyota suppliers (Dyer,
1996). A strategic supplier, working with a  buyer to develop new
products, can showcase its capabilities to other customers of the
buyer that then lead to  other business opportunities (Narayandas
and Rangan, 2004; Ro et al., 2008). Alternatively, the supply
network may  open up opportunities for the buyer to identify
more capable replacements for the incumbent supplier or for the
supplier to identify more attractive customers to sell to than the
incumbent buyer. The availability of these attractive alternatives
increases the risk of relationship termination.
3.1.3. Equivalence at the level of identity
Equivalence at the level of identity generates principles describ-
ing, explaining, or predicting relationships in  both the metaphor
and target. While novelty is a  desired virtue of these princi-
ples, the requirement is  that these statements aptly apply to
both phenomena. In the case of divorce as a  theory-constitutive
metaphor of strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution, at
least five principles are identifiable.
Principle 1 (The cost–benefit principle). For any given strategic rela-
tionship, when the costs incurred by the parties to maintain the
strategic relationship outweigh the benefits from its maintenance, the
strategic relationship is  more likely to be dissolved.
A strategic relationship bestows benefits that include eco-
nomic gains and access to economic resources through expanded
social networks but also incurs costs that  include invested time
and resources, as well as the opportunity cost of not having the
resources for other usage (Good and Evans, 2001) and the reduced
autonomy from having to  accommodate the relationship partner
(Levinger, 1979; Hakansson and Snehota, 1998). When realized
benefits outweigh incurred costs, the motivation for both parties
to stay in the relationship is  high.
When a viable alternative exists for one party, the opportunity
cost to stay with the existing relationship increases for the party
with the viable alternative. In  order for the party with the viable
alternative to actually switch, the opportunity cost of not getting
into a new strategic relationship plus the opportunity cost to stay in
the current strategic relationship must outweigh the benefit of not
switching. Otherwise, the viable alternative is not attractive enough
to motivate the party with this option to consider this opportunity.
The literature pertaining to interpersonal relationships (Levinger,
1965) finds that incumbent relationships are more likely to be  dis-
solved when viable and attractive alternatives become available;
this finding is also reported in the literature pertaining to inter-firm
relationships (Wagner and Friedl, 2007).
When a party considers terminating a  relationship, it weighs
the benefits from termination against the costs of termination. Dis-
solving a strategic relationship may  generate psychological benefits
(e.g., relief from the stress of continuing a  relationship) (Tashiro
et  al., 2006), social benefits (e.g., distancing oneself from the
poor reputation of the other party) (Helm, 2004), and/or material
benefits (e.g., liberating resources tied to an unprofitable strate-
gic relationship) (Helm et al., 2006; Pressey and Qiu, 2007). The
costs of dissolving a  strategic relationship may  include the loss
of current and future economic gains, partial or complete loss
of control over existing assets, and non-recoverable investments
(Williamson, 1985). Often, dissolving a  strategic relationship has
to be litigated as well. When the costs to dissolve outweigh the
benefits from dissolving, the status quo is  likely to be preserved, as
observed with unsatisfying but stable relationships in  the context of
buyer–supplier relationships in the German automotive industry
(Backhaus and Buschken, 1999)  or with stable unhappy marriages
in  the context of interpersonal relationships (Heaton and Albrecht,
1991).
Principle 2  (The fairness-satisfaction principle). For any given strate-
gic relationship, the party who  believes it is being unfairly treated
becomes dissatisfied and is more likely to then initiate dissolution of
the strategic relationship.
For both parties in  a strategic relationship to perceive it as fair,
either both parties invest and receive similar amounts of benefits
or the party investing more receives proportionally larger bene-
fits (Guerrero et al., 2001; Kumar et al., 1995). Perceived fairness
is especially important in  strategic relationships since the timing
and size  of investments by one party often differ from those of
the other party (Konovsky, 2000; Dyer et al., 2008). While parties
in a  strategic relationship often accept short-term imbalances,
carrying these balances over the long run  motivates the disadvan-
taged party to decrease its inputs into maintaining the relationship
(Griffith et al., 2006). In marriages, women often initiate divorce
when their accrued investments exceed their overall gains or when
their investments outpace those of their partner (Braver et al.,
1993; Amato and Irving, 2006). In  mutually profitable strategic
buyer–supplier relationships, a  buyer (or supplier) who believes it
has unfairly received a smaller share of benefits is  likely to reduce
its commitment to  the strategic relationship (Ravald and Gronroos,
1996; Kumar, 1996; Roolaht, 2004).
Imbalances in benefit distribution that  are perceived to be unfair
result in dissatisfaction with the strategic relationship (Alwin,
1987). Decreasing satisfaction from imbalances (i.e., unfairness) is
reported for both interpersonal (e.g., Molm,  1991)  and inter-firm
relationships (e.g., Griffith et al., 2006; Kumar et al., 1995; Yilmaz
et al., 2004). The advantaged party (e.g., financial, power, etc.) also
experiences declining satisfaction due to a  sense of guilt (Bantham
et al., 2003; Cate et al., 1988). Note that a high level of satisfaction
is critical to the continuity of a  strategic relationship, as it creates a
positive halo to  buffer the strategic relationship from actions taken
by either party that negatively impact the relationship (Hibbard
et al., 2001; Kalmijn, 1999).
Principle 3 (The co-generation principle). For any given strategic
relationship, when the  parties involved do not engage in opportunities
to produce a joint outcome, the strategic relationship is more likely to
be dissolved.
Marriage is not a  necessary condition for biological reproduction
but children of wedlock is often preferred for reasons of property
or religious ideology (Levins and Lewontin, 2003). The abilities to
have children and to provide adequate support for a  family are
important factors in selecting marital partners (Cohen, 1987).  As
such, marriages without children are more likely to end in  divorce
(Becker, 1973; Buckle et al., 1996; Popenoe, 1996; Zeifman and
Hazan, 1997).
Strategic buyer–supplier relationships are frequently formed
to co-generate value and co-produce products (Wikstrom, 1996;
Wilkinson, 2008).  Thus, when selecting suppliers with whom to
build strategic relationships, buyers consider such criteria as prod-
uct development capabilities and provision of after-sales support
(Ellram, 1990; Levitt, 1983).  Hence, strategic buyer–supplier rela-
tionships in  which the two  parties do not engage in activities that
co-generate value have a  higher risk of being terminated.
Principle 4  (The least-interest principle).  For any given strategic rela-
tionship, the party that  is least dependent on the strategic relationship
is most likely to initiate dissolution.
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When two parties form a strategic union, they gain access to
one another’s resources and opportunities and, as a consequence,
become mutually dependent. The effort that one party expends
to continue a strategic relationship is proportional to its level of
dependence on the other party and vice versa (Emerson, 1962).
The party that is  more dependent is  likely to put greater effort into
the relationship. A party’s dependence on the strategic relationship
is, in turn, a function of the availability of attractive alternatives
(Dwyer et al., 1987). Additionally, when one party controls more
resources than its counterpart, the two parties have asymmet-
ric dependence, with the party controlling more resources having
more relative power, influence, and options (Adamsons and Pasley,
2006). This party is less dependent on the counterpart and more
likely to initiate relationship dissolution.
In traditional marriages, wage earners are often male (i.e.,
fathers) while homemakers are often females (i.e., mothers)
(Furstenberg, 1990). Fathers, as wage earners, typically control
more financial resources than mothers, who have greater control
over intangible resources, such as access to children (Hetherington
and Stanley-Hagan, 1995). With a  traditional marriage, the mother
appears to be more dependent on the father with respect to finan-
cial resources while the father appears to be more dependent on
the mother with respect to intangible resources (e.g., access to chil-
dren). However, since the mother often receives primary custody of
children in a divorce (Furstenberg, 1990) and, with this, child sup-
port (above and beyond alimony), she  retains her greater control
over access to children when divorce occurs (Braver et al., 2006),
without loss of access to financial resources. The father in a  divorce
has reduced access to children, as well as reduced control over
financial resources that have to be transferred to the mother. As
such, between mothers and fathers, the former is more likely to
initiate divorce (Amato and Irving, 2006).
Asymmetric dependence between buyers and suppliers, like-
wise, jeopardizes relationship stability (Toni and Nassimbeni,
1995; Zirpoli and Caputo, 2002). Unlike marriages, identifying the
party who is least-interested in  continuing the strategic relation-
ship tends to be less straightforward and may  be  context-specific.
A buyer, for example, is more likely to terminate a  supplier in a
close but adversarial relationship (Mudambi and Helper, 1998).
Conversely, a buyer is  less likely to initiate relationship dissolu-
tion with a strategic supplier from whom a  unique component is
sourced since substitute supply sources may  not be readily avail-
able (Bensaou and Anderson, 1999). In general, the party in  a
strategic buyer–supplier relationship with the least to  lose is more
likely to instigate relationship termination.
Principle 5 (The separation-division principle). When a given strate-
gic relationship is dissolved, the parties have to separate their
materialistic, psychological, and social network unions and to then
reallocate ownership of common assets and negotiate accountability
for jointly-produced outcomes.
The formation of a strategic relationship facilitates a  union of
material assets, psychological support, and social network access;
its dissolution triggers their separation and mandates the distribu-
tion of jointly-owned assets and jointly-produced outcomes. For
a marriage, such distribution has to ensure equitable distribution
(American Law Institute, 2002). For a  strategic buyer–supplier rela-
tionship, specific assets have to be divided in  a  fair manner, breach
of contract payments have to be  agreed to, and product and parts
liability reimbursements have to be  settled in  accordance with con-
tract laws (Frier and White, 2008).
The division of jointly-owned assets and jointly-produced out-
comes does not always proceed smoothly. Judicial oversight often
becomes necessary due to the difficulty in classifying joint versus
non-joint assets and the indivisible properties of certain types of
joint assets. Occupational licenses and educational degrees earned
during marriage, for example, may  be considered to be  joint prop-
erties that are  not  divisible (Dallon, 2001). Likewise, in a strategic
buyer–supplier relationship, a  jointly-produced product is a  joint
asset whose intellectual property and copyright are not divisible.
A successful division of jointly-owned assets and jointly-
produced outcomes does not connote that interactions desist
between the parties in  a  dissolved relationship. Former spouses
may have to interact to fulfill child custody obligations. Similarly,
buyers and suppliers may  have to interact until jointly-owned tech-
nology has been divided or disposed of or  until product warranties
are no longer binding.
3.2. Post-metaphorical transfer: implications and discussion
Making divorce a  theory-constitutive metaphor for strategic
buyer–supplier relationship dissolution promotes theorizing about
the latter in  terms of the former. This theorizing searches for and
frames the similarities between strategic buyer–supplier relation-
ship and divorce at the conceptual levels of ontology and analogy.
This theorizing also arrives at identity-level principles akin to the-
oretical propositions that are amenable to empirical testing. Once
complete, the metaphor transfer opens up  scientific insights from
divorce and their implications that  can be lead to further theo-
rizing regarding strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution.
We  highlight several of these opportunities in the paragraphs to
follow.
One interesting focus from illustrating a metaphorical trans-
fer of divorce for strategic buyer–supplier relationship dissolution
concerns joint investments and whether or not they are good indi-
cators of relationship stability. For example, when a  buyer involves
a strategic supplier in joint product development, does this involve-
ment engender a  more stable vertical business relationship? The
divorce literature, as it relates to joint investments in  the form of
children, offers various perspectives. One perspective, the theory
of the value of children, claims that the decision to have children
is  contingent on marital stability (Friedman et al., 1994). Buy-
ers and their strategic suppliers, as such, would not engage in
joint investments unless their relationship is already strong and
stable. Another perspective, one that takes an evolutionary lens,
argues that marriages without children are more likely to end in
divorce (Buss, 2003)  but that marriages with children reduce the
divorce rate but only up to the third child (Heaton, 1990). As such,
strategic buyer–supplier relationships that do  not  evolve into joint
investments would be more vulnerable to termination. Moreover,
increasing the number of joint investments between a  buyer and
its strategic supplier would strengthen the relationship only up to
a  point, beyond which the benefits of working together face dimin-
ishing marginal returns. The implications of these perspectives
from the divorce literature for joint investments (e.g., co-produced
products) in strategic buyer–supplier relationships merit further
theorizing and empirical research.
Another interesting focus concerns the effect of exclusivity (or
lack of) on the outcomes and stability of vertical business relation-
ships that are strategic in  nature. When a  buyer decides to add a
second supplier for a  component that it currently sources from a
strategic supplier, what impact does this action have on the buyer,
the strategic supplier, and the strategic relationship? Comparing
monogamy (i.e., one husband, one wife) to  polygyny (i.e., one hus-
band, multiple wives), the divorce literature finds that, on  average,
the husband in the latter scenario incurs increasingly higher costs
for each wife he marries (Friedman, 1990). If this divorce insight
is  applicable, then a  buyer pursuing dual or multiple sourcing for
the same component would have to  offer better terms to each
added supplier after the initial strategic supplier. This implication
runs counter to conventional wisdom that dual sourcing benefits
the buyer and draws attention to at least two thought-provoking
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questions worthy of further theorizing and empirical research (i.e.,
how and why a  buyer is  better or worse off  by adding a second
supplier and whether the second supplier should and does receive
better sourcing terms than the initial strategic supplier).
Finally, the divorce literature finds that two-wife marriages,
compared to monogamous marriages, are most stable but beyond
two wives the divorce rates increases (Gage-Brandon, 1992). More-
over, children raised in  households with two mothers have lower
intelligence scores than those raised in  households with three
or four mothers (Elbedour et al., 2003). By implication, would
buyer–supplier–supplier triads, such as those arising from dual
sourcing arrangements, be more stable than sole-sourcing arrange-
ments? Would new products co-developed by  a buyer and just two
strategic suppliers be more or less likely to  fail than new products
co-developed by  a  buyer and involving more than two strate-
gic suppliers (e.g., Boeing Dreamliner)? These questions deserve
deeper theorizing and empirical scrutiny.
4. Conclusion
Metaphors are frequently invoked in everyday language for their
ease of understanding. More powerfully, they can promote the
development of scientific knowledge once they become theory-
constitutive. Metaphorical transfer is  the process for ensuring that
a  metaphor transcends its casual usage to aid in theorizing about a
phenomenon of interest. This paper demonstrates how  to theorize
during and after metaphorical transfer.
To facilitate this demonstration, the paper illustrates a
metaphorical transfer of divorce for strategic buyer–supplier rela-
tionship dissolution and provides a  post-metaphorical transfer
discussion of how insights from divorce may  spur new theo-
rizing opportunities about strategic buyer–supplier relationships
and their continuance. Our intent is to inspire more theorizing
of OMS/SCM phenomena through the invocation of theory-
constitutive metaphors and to ensure the proper borrowing and
testing of theories from outside the OM/SCM discipline. Only then
can OM/SCM scholars begin to mitigate criticisms that OM/SCM
research is atheoretical or  pays inadequate attention to building
theories (Schmenner and Swink, 1998; Flynn et al., 1990).
Metaphorical transfer can be an invaluable theorizing mech-
anism for generating new insights into many Supply Chain
Management phenomena. For example, mating may  become a
theory-constitutive metaphor for theorizing about the process of
vendor selection or other acts of inter-organizational cooperation
(Wilkinson et al., 2005). Dancing may  become a theory-constitutive
metaphor for theorizing about how buyers interact with suppliers
and vice versa (Wilkinson and Young, 1994; Wilkinson et al., 1998).
Lastly, the human immune system may  be theoretically informative
as to how firms can secure their supply chains.
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